Wirtschaftsspionage in Verhandlungen aus Informationsökonomischer und Wirtschaftsetischer Perspektive : eine Interdisziplinäre Analyse

Document type: Dissertations
Full text:
Author(s): Klaus Solberg Søilen
Title: Wirtschaftsspionage in Verhandlungen aus Informationsökonomischer und Wirtschaftsetischer Perspektive : eine Interdisziplinäre Analyse
Translated title: Industrial espionage in international negotiations
Series: Blekinge Institute of Technology Dissertation Series
Year: 2004
Issue: 9
Pagination: 334
ISBN: 91-7295-050-1
ISSN: 1650-2159
Publisher: Blekinge Institute of Technology
City: Karlskrona
Organization: Blekinge Institute of Technology
Department: School of Management (Sektionen för management)
School of Management S- 371 79 Karlskrona
+46 455 38 50 00
http://www.bth.se/mam/
Authors e-mail: klaus.solberg-soilen@bth.se
Language: English
Abstract: The dissertation examines a case of industrial espionage by one of the parties involved in a forthcoming international negotiation. We want to know what consequences a burglary has for the actual negotiation. The dissertation consist of five hypothesis, of which the three first were empirically tested. The discussion of thesis four and five is supported basically by research literature, but have also found indirect support in the empirical study. A game theoretical model of four information sets is used.
Thesis 1: Pay-offs do not change significantly from one information set to the other. confirmed
Thesis 2: Behavior do not change significantly from one information set to the other. confirmed
Thesis 3: The perception of fairness do not change significantly from one information set to the other. confirmed
Thesis 4: International negotiations is socially so complex that it only makes sense to study the phenomena from an interdisciplinary angle. confirmed
Thesis 5: A descriptive evolutionary approach can be an alternative to neoclassical economic theory in understanding the study of international negotiations. confirmed
The study also confirms that economic theory is correct in excluding the ethical dimension from their models, as these factors have little influence on the end price. Fairness plays only a minor role in international negotiations.

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Subject: Business Administration\Information
Keywords: Business Intelligence, Competitive Intelligence, International Negotiations, Game Theory, Information Sets, Industrial Espionage, Economic Theory, Evolutionary Economics, International Business
Note: Forskarens hemsida: http://www.bth.se/iem/kss.nsf Disputerat vid Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, http://www.uni-leipzig.de/ Avhandlingen utgiven av BTH.
URN: urn:nbn:se:bth-00295
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