

# Cross-Regional Learning

## First impressions from a cross-regional learning project between Blekinge and Vestfold

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### 1 Two stories about regional development

In the 1990s the eastern part of the county of Blekinge was one of the fastest growing regions in Sweden. From virtually nothing the ICT-industry grew to more than 100 enterprises with over 5000 employees. Innovation networks comprising companies, public sector and higher education draw nationwide attention. This progress was imprinted by a clear-cut leadership in which a few strong personalities from, in the first hand, business life and higher education stood forward. What remains today is an almost shattered network with few, if any, recognised leaders. The political leadership seems to have returned to its former behaviour, i.e. to rely on the presence of military bases in the region as the prime guarantee for jobs and social welfare.

In the county of Vestfold, Norway, the electronics industry has grown gradually since the 1960s, mostly through budding from already existing firms. Today the region around the town of Horten in the northern part of Vestfold is considered to be the main micro electronics cluster in Norway. There are more than 200 firms with around 5000 employees in the Horten region. The leadership has a collective and distributive character that involves a multitude of actors in a complex interplay. The industrial and economic progress in the region has been rather slow but substantial results have nonetheless been achieved. There is a robust development organisation characterised by a broad participation from all parts of the society and there are well developed structures of trust.

Our purpose with this short and of course very simplified comparison between two at the first glance rather similar industrial milieus is to illustrate that a thorough deliberation based on detailed knowledge about the history, the involved actors, their relations, and so on, is necessary if we want to learn something relevant about regional development processes. If this is not done it is not possible to proceed further than to the results of the macro studies, i.e. that leadership, cooperation, trust, and so forth are important factors for regional development and innovation. But we know that already, this is standard knowledge.

We argue, however, that it is possible to press further on and to learn more by comparing branch-like and on the surface similar industrial milieus if we focus on the differences. We are not, however, aiming at what is commonly called benchmarking or benchlearning<sup>1</sup>, but at a process we have designated as cross-regional learning<sup>2</sup>. That is, and in this case, together with the involved actors in Blekinge and Vestfold we will carry through such a learning process between the years 2004 and 2007. Our overarching goal is threefold: to be able to say something new about conditions for regional development, to further develop the theoretical prerequisites for cross-regional learning, and to achieve practical development results together with the ICT-milieu in Blekinge and the micro-electronics milieu in Vestfold. We intend to report our work in a series of studies of which this one is the first

We start off, then, by (2) discussing the possibilities to learn from the differences between two regional development processes. We continue by describing in more detail the development work so far done in (3) Blekinge and (4) Vestfold; these are the two development "histories" as they appear by the late fall of 2004. Then we focus (5) on some of the comparative dimensions we already now can see are especially interesting. In a finishing section (6)

we discuss how the methodological concepts of "space of experience" and "horizon of expectation" (Koselleck 2004) can be used in this context, i.e. in order not only to investigate and learn from what has already happened in Blekinge and Vestfold, but also from what is now happening, and from what is planned for the future. There are, indeed, links between past, present and future, i.e. the past is in the future, and the future in the past.

## 2 To learn from differences

Our point of departure is Gregory Bateson's (1972) famous *dictum* that "Information consists of differences that make a difference". Applied on our stories about Blekinge and Vestfold we understand Bateson like this: The differences between the two regions make a difference, i.e. this difference is a meta level that in itself has a particular knowledge value.

The two stories about Blekinge and Vestfold immediately show a number of differences. Yes, but when one discusses differences one often hastily hints at valuations like who is best or who is worst, which one has succeeded or which one has failed, and so forth. The problem with valuations like that is that they give very limited information. That A, for instance, is shown to be better than B is indeed rather uninteresting, i.e. if we do not know what scale of values is current. This, by the way, is one of the reasons why we think that the popular concepts of benchmarking and benchlearning are of limited value. With the concept of cross-regional learning we want to understand something more from the observed differences.

Thus, the profound meaning of Bateson's *dictum* is not that the sum of all observed differences constitutes a difference about who or what is best or worst, no, the thing is that the concept of information in the *dictum* is the result of a difference of the second order. Put differently: The differences (of the first order) between Blekinge and Vestfold constitute a difference (of the second order) compared to our knowledge and ideas, and perhaps also to our taken-for-granted assumptions about regional development, about partnership, about the role of the university, etc. Thus, the prerequisite for the comparisons to be informative in this more profound meaning is that the immediately observable differences (of the first order) are used as points of departure for joint reflections about the difference (of the second order) compared to (in this case when it comes to regional development) both our espoused theories and our theories-in-action. Joint reflection of the kind can lead to cross-regional learning.

## 3 Blekinge

### **Background to the regional development in Blekinge in the 1990s<sup>3</sup>**

Blekinge is one of the two smallest counties in Sweden. However, with 160.000 inhabitants the population density is high. The county has borders in the north to the counties of Kalmar and Kronoberg, in the west to the Skåne region, and in the east and south to the Baltic Sea. Through Blekinge, from east to west, goes the National Highway E 22. From two harbours there is regular ferry-traffic to Poland and the Baltic states. From the airport in Ronneby there are daily tours to Stockholm and to Palanga in Lithuania. There are five municipalities in Blekinge, from east to west: Karlskrona (county administrative centre), Ronneby, Karlshamn, Sölvesborg and Olofström.

During the 1990s the eastern part of Blekinge, in the first hand Karlskrona and Ronneby, and later on Karlshamn, quite suddenly appeared as one of the fastest growing regions in Sweden. The main driving force behind this expansion was the growth in the ICT-industry. The number of employees within the industry grew with more than 400 per cent. At the be-

ginning of the new millennium there were more than 100 firms within this cluster, that employed more than 5000 people.

But still in the mid-80s the future of the region was regarded to be bleak, to say the least. The region was characterised by a big but rapidly shrinking defence sector, an industry sector that was dominated by production units to Swedish companies with headquarters and development departments in other regions, a weak entrepreneurial tradition and few new companies, a limited supply of professional services, and no higher education.

But, at a time when utter stagnation seemed to be unavoidable for both Karlskrona and Ronneby the trend took a surprisingly new course. A new, modern and development oriented business life started to grow. The more specific causes of this unexpected turn of events were a mixture of local initiatives, a couple of critical decisions taken outside the region, and some fortunate circumstances.

### **Ronneby**

It all started in Ronneby, a municipality with 30.000 inhabitants, situated 30 km to the west of Karlskrona. After a series of shut downs and downsizings in 1984 the unemployment figures in the municipality approached 10 per cent of the workforce. In January 1985 Volvo announced that the ironworks had to shut down, and further 400 people had to go.

In this situation the political leadership had to choose between two alternatives, either to ask the Government in Stockholm for public support, or to try to do something themselves. They opted for the second alternative and sat down a taskforce with the assignment to develop concrete projects that were later to be presented to the Minister for Industry, *nota bene*, not in order to ask for financial support, but in order to inform and to ask for advice.

One of the many project ideas was to establish a centre for education, R&D, and software engineering – "Soft Center", as it was called. This idea was presented at a time when research parks and technology centres were popular solutions in Swedish regional politics. In the Ronneby case three prerequisites were identified in order for the project to succeed: (a) Soft Center had to have a critical mass of companies; (b) It had to include education and further education on different levels; (c) As soon as possible R&D projects had to get started. And surprisingly soon Ronneby succeeded to get support from the software industry, but also from prestigious institutions like The Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences. In April 1987 the first Soft Center building was opened and a second was started just months later.

In March 1988, after some discussion, the Government proposed to the Riksdag that a University College should be established in Blekinge, and that it ought to have a profile towards software engineering. Just a couple of days after the positive decision in the Riksdag the Soft Center board started to plan for the new University College. Education in software engineering, data processing and business administration were to be placed in Ronneby, while pure technological educations were to be located to Karlskrona.

### **Karlskrona**

Indeed, the situation in Karlskrona during the 1980s was also characterised by gloominess. Business life was dominated by a handful of units that were owned by large internationalised Swedish corporations that produced standardised products aimed at stagnating markets. The educational level of the workforce was low.

The political leadership was aware of the situation but a radically different strategy was settled on than the one that was implemented in Ronneby. That is, they asked Stockholm for substitution industries. In fact, they asked for the localisation of a car factory to Karlskrona. When this failed, they asked for an engine factory. This also failed. Instead the Government decided to locate a mobile phone operator to Karlskrona. The first reaction in Karlskrona was

disappointment. One wished a "real" factory that produced physical products, but what one got was something one did not understand.

Thus, in the fall of 1990 Karlskrona had both a University College and a mobile phone operator, but there was still no public development strategy for the municipality. However, one of the leading business CEOs (chief executive officer) tried to convince the municipal commissioner (kommunalarådet) to put a stake on the telecom industry, an industry with a bright future. This was very much so, he argued, because in Karlskrona there was already production of telecom products (Ericsson), a software company specialised in telecommunication (EP-Data), and, as from now, also a mobile phone operator (Nordic Tel). Besides, there was also a University College with capacity to build competence within the field of telecommunication.

He got no response from the commissioner and the political establishment. The newly appointed first president of the University College, however, happened to be a trained scientist in signal processing, a field with strong connections to telecommunication. He and the CEO now established themselves as two instigators in order to convince the political leadership that here was a unique possibility for Karlskrona to create something new. The politicians remained doubtful.

After some time, however, they succumbed and appointed a project leader in order to develop the concept. Now, the president, the CEO and the new project leader succeeded to cooperate smoothly and they soon established themselves as an informal leadership and policy group for the regional development ambitions. Their contributions were manifested in the TelecomCity project that was established in 1993. This was the beginning of a new era for Karlskrona.

TelecomCity was organised as a network comprising the most important telecom businesses, the university college and the municipality. Within the framework of this network both formal and informal meetings were held. The glue that kept the network together, however, was the self-interest of each actor. To the companies contacts with both the university college and the municipal administration offered opportunities to enhance the business life prospects. To the university college the network offered opportunities to involve the firms in the educational programmes and to discuss research projects. To the municipality the network was like a sounding board in order to listen to what the firms and the university college expected from the politicians and the municipal administrative staff. Thus, as long as TelecomCity was a small network that comprised a handful of big companies, a university college and the municipality the self interest of each actor was strong enough not only to keep the network together but also to produce results.

In this context the importance of the individual actors cannot be overestimated. The personal qualifications of the project leader are an important factor in order to understand the dynamism that was created around TelecomCity. He was a dedicated person with the ear of the companies as well as of the university college and the politicians. Furthermore, the president of the university college was a true entrepreneur. He realised that it was a must for a university college profiled towards applied information technology that the local telecom industry was dynamic. The individual CEOs, on the other hand, had room for manoeuvres and they were anxious to wash away the mark on Karlskrona as a peripheral and stagnating crisis community. The prime role for the politicians in this joint effort was to carry out the orders that were made from the university college and the companies.

Thus, during the second part of the 1990s the number of members in TelecomCity grew at a fast rate. At the end of the decade there were in Karlskrona about 30 telecom companies with roughly 4000 employees. Of these about one third, with about 1000 employees, could be found close to the university college, which by now was renamed to Blekinge Institute of

Technology (BTH). The new name was a manifestation that the Government now had granted partial university rights to the Institute.

### **After the party**

Thus, when the IT-boom culminated in the spring of 2000 almost 5000 people were employed in the ICT sector in Karlskrona and Ronneby. But, during the following two years the amount decreased with one third.

In Ronneby the politicians decided to sell Soft Center. All the buildings were sold to a private actor who had no previous experiences of real estate management. The first years of the new millennium thus turned out to be a turbulent time for Soft Center with frequent shifts of CEOs for the research park. At the same time the recession within the IT-sector led to more and more unlet premises. With private ownership of Soft Center also followed that it, by and by, was transformed into an ordinary business hotel.

Today there are 33 companies in Soft Center. What still makes Soft Center a particular place is that the buildings accommodate both businesses and higher education. The Ronneby branch of Blekinge Institute of Technology is situated on the premises, as is one unit within Ericsson and UIQ that develop software for advanced mobile telephones. Between the Institute and occasional companies like UIQ there is cooperation. Most companies in Soft Center, however, do not have direct relations with the Institute any more.

In Karlskrona the downfall in the ICT-industry meant that the number of members in the TelecomCity network decreased. Today there are 33 members with in all 4300 employees. A handful of these members are situated in Ronneby. The situation in recent years has been characterised by downsizing in the bigger companies and acquisitions and shut downs among the smaller. At the same time, though, there are some new members, all of them small production companies.

What has happened the last four years has changed the way the companies look at TelecomCity, and in the first hand what they expect to get from the network. During the 1990s TelecomCity was an important arena for discussions about recruitment of qualified personnel to Blekinge. During the last couple of years when the companies are continually downsizing the common problems are not that obvious. The big companies still dominate the formal side of TelecomCity but today it is not that easy to identify fields where there self-interest motivate united efforts. This picture is enhanced by the fact that parallel with the downsizing there is also centralisation. That is, the big companies in Karlskrona have gradually been deprived of their independence and room for strategic decisions. Operations are more and more, and again, directed from Stockholm.

TelecomCity has also been affected by changes within Blekinge Institute of Technology. The first president has moved on to another job and has left Karlskrona. His successor has a more traditional academic profile and is not taking part as enthusiastically in regional development activities as his predecessor. What is more, TelecomCity's successful project leader has also moved on to another job. In sum, the turnover of leading profiles has contributed to increase the political control over the TelecomCity network, along with an increase of the public economic responsibility for the project.

However, the successes of Soft Center in Ronneby and TelecomCity in Karlskrona in the 1990s also stimulated Karlshamn (the next municipality to the west of Ronneby) to take the initiative to a similar project called NetPort.Karlshamn. The goal is that the project will develop to a leading competence centre focused on technological development within media, event industry and intelligent logistics. The role of NetPort is to be an actor in the interplay between business life, politics and higher education. Though, the scope of the activities is still rather small.

### **The project "Wireless communications"**

In 2001 the Swedish National Agency for Innovation Systems (Vinnova) invited to a region competition in order to develop innovation systems. 400 MSEK were to be shared between three or four winners. The competition was organised in two steps, first a short application for planning resources, and then, after a reduction of the applicants by Vinnova, a complete application, and among them the winners should be picked out.

What now followed in Blekinge is a strange story to tell, but we think it is important to do it in some detail. Because, this is, we think, an empirical case with an abundance of both differences of both the first and second order, and thus it is very informative; it is a case of both trust and mistrust, and of tenacious patterns of both experiences and expectations. We will come back to a preliminary analysis of the significance in the last section of the study.

In order to respond to Vinnova's invitation Blekinge Institute of Technology took the initiative to a preliminary project with representatives for Telecom-City, Soft Center and Net-Port.Karlshamn. The idea was to upgrade the three existing local innovation systems in Karlskrona, Ronneby and Karlshamn to a regional innovation system. The work process with the first application thus was a social process in which four representatives from BTH and three from the three concerned municipalities orally agreed.

However, from the start there was an almost palpable mistrust from the three municipal representatives that the whole scheme really was about to help the researchers to allocate only more resources to themselves. They also expressed worries that a project in order to build a regional innovation system would result in negative effects on the local efforts in each municipality. By and by, though, the mutual trust grew as did the satisfaction with the idea to build and carry through a joint project, which was now given the name "Wireless Communications".

So far the companies had not been invited to discussions about the application. This was due to the judgement that it was important that the three municipalities first could agree to the project. Three companies, representing different links in the value chain within telecommunications, were therefore invited when there was already a first draft for the application. The choice of companies was guided by a consideration to take aboard big and well known companies with a documented development competence in the ICT field. The three chosen companies accepted to join the project.

When the work with the first and short application was almost finished the BTH representatives suggested that the former project leader for TelecomCity, now a consultant with his own firm, would be recruited as project leader for the forthcoming work. After much debate this was accepted and the application could be sent to Vinnova.

"Wireless communications" was given a planning grant for the second step, i.e. to draw up a complete application. However, Vinnova remarked that there were no politicians in the steering group for the suggested innovation system in Blekinge. That is, the municipal representatives that had worked with the application so far were administrative staff people. This was not accepted by Vinnova. Now, this problem was solved through the creation of a board for the entire project. Members of the board were the president of BTH, the mayors ("kommunalråden") from the three involved municipalities and the CEOs from the three big companies. It was also decided that the board was not to be activated until a complete draft for the final application was on the table.

The work with the final application continued in the group that wrote the first application but was now enlarged by the hired project leader and representatives for the three companies. The suggested board was to be convened when the application was ready to be sent to Vinnova, but unfortunate circumstances made it that the board did not meet until after Vinnova had made its decision.

"Wireless communications" was not picked out by Vinnova as one of the three winners, but the project got a planning grant of 1.5 MSEK in order to write a new application to the next competition that was announced to be held in 2004.

This was the situation when the board met for the first time. The mayor of Karlskrona now argued that if the board was to take over the responsibility for the continued work it was necessary that the board also functioned as the executive project body. Hence, the board should meet regularly and decide how the work with the new application should be organised. Furthermore, all three mayors were hesitant to the fact that the project so far had been administered by BTH.

However, it soon became apparent that the board had not developed the same sense of mutual trust that characterised the team that had worked out the first two applications. This lack of trust was noticeable already the second time the board met. Because now the mayor of Karlskrona was anxious to limit the project. He made it clear that the project must *not* be understood as an attempt to integrate the three local innovation systems into one regional system.

He also demanded that the hired project leader with experience from TelecomCity only should take part in the work with the new application. Should "Wireless Communications" become one of the 2004 winners he should have to leave the team and be replaced by someone else. Yet another demand was that the board ought to designate an executive committee consisting of the chairman, himself and a representative from one of the companies. A third demand was that parallel to the work with the application an analysis should be carried through about where the financial and administrative responsibility for the project should be placed.

These demands for control thus resulted in that the team of motivated people that had worked with the two first applications now in reality was disconnected from the project. Instead the responsibility was taken over by three actors that had not been involved in the earlier phases. In this way a spontaneous process was replaced by a formal organisation, and the ambition to involve more and more actors in the process was abandoned.

"Wireless Communications" was not picked out as a winner in the 2004 competition either. Today it is therefore an open question if, and if so how, this regional innovation process will continue.

## 4 Vestfold

### **Background<sup>4</sup>**

Vestfold is the smallest county ("fylke") in Norway. However, with 220 000 inhabitants it is after Oslo the most densely populated county in the country. Vestfold is situated straight south of Oslo, along the west coast of the fjord. Via ferries from a couple of harbours and from an international airport in Sandefjord there are good communications with Sweden, Denmark and the Continent. The most important industries in the county are within the fields of (and in order of importance) electronics, maritime activities, food, farming and tourism. In this study we will focus on how the electronics industry has emerged around the town of Horten.

The electronics industry in Vestfold today consists of more than 200 companies with over 5000 employees. The biggest companies like Kongsberg Maritime, SensoNor and GE Vingmed Ultrasound are market leaders within their respective niches, both nationally and internationally. The electronics cluster around Horten area has gradually developed for over 40 years. That is, a fair proportion of today's enterprises have their origin in four companies that were established in the Horten area in the mid 1960s. Through spin outs, partitions, and mergers a large industrial milieu has emerged where managers, engineers and other professionals

have been working together at different occasions in their careers. This has created a rather strong "relational infrastructure" where there are many links and where the level of trust is high. Some CEOs early on realised that they were dependant of this network in order to get access to information and competence. This was the more important because the network could compensate for the downsides with small enterprises in an international market with high innovation turnover.

As early as in the 1970s this informal CEO-network led to the emergence of an identity among the companies that they were an "industrial milieu" and the concept "Electronic Coast" (EC) was used for the first time. Today the Electronic Coast network is organised as a association with 46 members, a CEO and a board.

### **A system for learning**

The expressed purpose with the EC association is to contribute to innovation and renewal through cooperation. This purpose is based on an understanding that innovations can be supported through the establishment of co-operational relations between enterprises, public agencies and higher education institutions. This is in line with both triple helix thinking and the concept of developmental coalitions ("utviklingskoalisjoner"), even though praxis within this field is indeed older than both these concepts. The idea that development can be created through cooperation is reflected in the way the EC network operates, i.e. where the firms, the Horten municipality, the Vestfold County Council, the University College of Vestfold, national research institutions, and development agencies cooperate.

Cooperation, yes, but about what? To the companies in the Horten area development and use of competence, i.e. learning, is the central issue. Therefore, attached to the EC concept a row of activities has been developed, sub networks and intermediary institutions that contribute in a way that managers learn more and faster. Learning is supported both through personal networks for problem solving, through regular training, and through exchanges of experiences. The following are some examples of what has come up from the EC cooperation:

- A tailor made management course. This "Management Academy" is offered to top and middle managers in the network.
- Professionals are offered training, education and certification through Vestfold Competence Ltd, a company jointly owned by the companies in the network.
- In close contact with the network Vestfold University College is organising bachelor and master programmes in micro electronics.
- "Avanse", a network of personnel managers, has developed a flexible labour market between some of the companies. On a high level of trust and confidence information about the labour situation is exchanged so early that the labour force can be given relevant training and be moved between the companies instead of being made redundant.
- In another sub network called "Production Manager Forum" experiences about production related issues are at the centre of interest.
- Professional seminars are organised on an ongoing basis, and a website contributes to the dissemination of news in various fields of interest to the network members.
- Micro Tech Innovation Ltd has been jointly established as the first step on the way to a national micro electronics centre. Today the company has incubator functions and functions as a node between the University College and the industry.

In this way it is possible to understand the EC network as a strategy to develop and organise a learning system. It is important to notice, though, that in this kind of developmental thinking the intermediate institutions are established in order to organise the cooperation, to give identity and orientation, and to solve concrete development issues between the primary

organisations, i.e. the companies in the network. The EC network, Micro Tech Innovation Ltd, and Vestfold Competence Ltd are examples of these intermediate institutions, they become actors in their own right and they have to be seen as nodes in the network.

### **Regional development supported by national initiatives**

Hence, it is an important issue for the Horten industry and the institutional actors in the county of Vestfold how the interplay between companies, higher education and public institutions ought to be organised in order to support innovation and regional development. However, this issue coincides with the national R&D policies.

That is, regional and industrial development activities in the Horten area are supported by mainly two national initiatives. One is the ARENA programme, the other is the action-research oriented program Verdiskaping (Value creation) 2010. Both programmes are designed in cooperation between national actors such as Innovation Norway, The Industrial Development Corporation of Norway (SIVA), Research Council of Norway, Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO), Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and some ministries.

### **The ARENA-programme, the Inno-tech project and Value Creation 2010**

The main objective for the ARENA programme is to increase the value creation in regional industrial districts and clusters. Within the programme Innovation Norway has established the project Inno-tech that started 2003 and which will go on for five years. There are four objectives: spin-outs and new business starts, risk capital, competence building, and cooperation between industry and higher education. The project has its own manager and board.

The research programme VS2010 will, as the acronym implies, go on until the year 2010. The main objective is value creation in industry and business through cooperation between work researchers, management and employees in corporations, regional higher education and public institutions. Cooperation on a broad scale from the employees and other concerned actors is the central principal of VS2010. The programme is focused on the organisational and social aspects of innovation processes. In Vestfold a group of researchers from the Work Research Institute (Arbeidsforskningsinstituttet, AFI) works in Oslo in close collaboration with the University College of Vestfold and the EC network.

These two programmes, ARENA and VS2010, supplement each other. The Inno-tech project in the ARENA programme and the VS2010 activities in Vestfold constitute the nucleus of the Norwegian part of the cross-regional learning project with Blekinge.

### **Organising for development on the regional level**

The electronics industry in the Horten area is considered to be the most important industrial milieu in Vestfold. For a long period of time it has played a central role in the regional development strategies. Public institutions have not only acted directly and individually towards this industry, but also through a regional partnership. In fact, for the last ten years this partnership has constituted the organisational framework for regional development in Vestfold. Among other achievements the partnership has rightly got the credit for the exceptional successful establishment of Sandefjord International Airport.

Between 2002 and 2004 a series of coincidental events led to a renewal and strengthening of the regional partnership in Vestfold. At the same time as the County Council ("Fylkeskommunen") was assigned by Stortinget to take the responsibility for the regional development issues, the old partnership realised that there was a demand for revitalisation and renewal. The partnership had not achieved much the years before and the motivation was rather low. On top of that it was obvious that the general election in the fall of 2003 should result in a major reshuffling of politicians. A study of actors, arenas and relations, done by the Work

Research Institute (Brøgger & Finsrud 2003) gave the impulse to a broad process where the old partnership took the responsibility to create the new. This process culminated in a dialogue conference at the end of the autumn 2003 in which the actors succeeded in creating a new platform for the regional partnership. The new chairman for the County Council was given the leadership in this newly constructed partnership. And what was more, the new partnership succeeded to unlock the old and very complicated and politically infected issue of how to extend and rebuild the National Highway (E18) through the county. This key issue has in a short time given the partnership a broad legitimacy and demonstrated a capacity for action and rethinking. Today the partnership consists of representatives of the political leadership for the County Council, for the County Governor, for the regional Labour Market Agency, for the 14 municipalities in Vestfold, for NHO and LO in Vestfold, and for the University College.

Parallel to this there has also been established a political superstructure between the three counties of Vestfold, Buskerud and Telemark. A Regional Council with eleven politicians from each county now has got the responsibility to take decisions in joint industrial and communicational issues for the three counties. The question is, if this means that the distance between the politicians and the concrete industrial matters will increase even more, or if it will strengthen holistic policies and the growth of a stronger and more functional regional level.

## 5 Differences between Blekinge and Vestfold

### **Introduction**

Even if we restrict our field of inquiry to regional development, there are of course a myriad of differences between Blekinge and Vestfold. In this first study, therefore, we have to start with some obvious differences, i.e. what immediately sticks out and come to our attention. At the same time we have to be aware of, that what is obvious is not necessarily the most interesting.

### **Historical differences**

Anyway, what immediately sticks out as an almost palpable difference between the development processes in Blekinge and Vestfold has to do with the events seen in a conventionally historical perspective. As we have seen, in Blekinge a rather dramatic row of events unfolded from the mid 1980s, events that accelerated until the spring of 2000. This process has not come to a complete stop, but there is now a considerable slow-down. Furthermore, it is now possible to see, that the past twenty years at hindsight might be described as a particular historical time for Blekinge, an epoch with an entrepreneurial start, an intensive and almost euphoric middle phase, and now an "after the party" phase.

In Vestfold, on the other hand, we can see a considerably less dramatic process, a process that has developed more slowly and with deep historical roots. The first electronics companies developed subsurface sensors to the Navy that had its main base and wharf in Horten. From these first companies more and more enterprises spun out. But, in spite of the close down of the wharf in 1984 there was no real labour market crisis similar to what happened in Blekinge in the mid 1980s. In the early 1990s it was obvious, though, that the growth within the electronics sector was going on outside Vestfold, and it was this insight that was the start for the measures and processes that is the meat of the beef in our story about Vestfold. *Nota bene*, this is not a story about an acute do-or-die situation like in Ronneby, or a sudden popping up industrial opportunity like the one in Karlskrona. No, it has been, and it still is, a story about a comparatively slow process of change.

There is of course much more to say about the historical differences, but we argue that already these indicated differences are enough to point at a difference of the second order. What we have in mind is the fact that in spite of striking differences regarding the regional development process in Blekinge and Vestfold there have nevertheless emerged high-tech innovation systems and clusters in both of them. Our tentative conclusion is, then, that the theories in this field, which are basically aimed at geographical (spatial) and economical (causal) explanations, need to be complemented with historical (temporal) aspects. However, what temporal aspects really are about is far from self-evident. We will, therefore, come back to this at some length after having deliberated over some other differences.

### **Differences regarding actors and networks**

We have also been stricken by the fact that the leading actors in Blekinge and Vestfold have behaved differently, to say the least. The process in Blekinge was led by relatively few but charismatic and strong individuals, as well in the first phase in Ronneby as during the most dynamic phase in Karlskrona. In Vestfold we have noticed a more distributed and collective leadership in a more balanced and institutionalised context.

The "ownership" of the two development processes is also different. In Blekinge one has once again become actors in someone else's play. The road from blazing local initiatives, own ideas and local and regional ownership of the development process has gradually reversed to a situation characterised by external ownership where arguably local politicians have taken over, but where support from the ministries and national development agencies in Stockholm again is seen as unavoidably necessary. It is true that one does not ask for car factories any more, but one is begging for the military bases. That is, when it comes to the development process one is back in square one. In this perspective the dynamism of the development process in Blekinge, from 1985 to 2000, can actually be perceived as a short but fierce "uprising" against the old structures of dependence and weak structures of trust. However, and given this picture, it is important to remember that although this process was initiated in Ronneby by local people – later swept aside by "responsible" citizens – the process in Karlskrona was started and led by newcomers to Blekinge, either to BTH or to the ICT-corporations.

In Vestfold one is well aware of the fact that there is not much help to be expected from Oslo. The general opinion is that no one in Oslo thinks it is necessary to give support to Vestfold since the standard of living on the "Gold Coast" is high, perhaps highest in Norway, and redundancy is low. Nationwide regional development programmes initiated in Oslo, it is said in Vestfold, always give the lion's share of programme resources to the northern regions while Vestfold gets nothing or very little. However, the situation is more complicated and ambiguous than these general, but in fact rather populist notions imply. Recently (Dec 2004) the electronic industry in the Horten area was named a Centre of Expertise pilot project by the Ministry for Industry. But virtually at same time (Jan 2005) it was decided by the Research Council that the important VS2010 programme should lay down its activities in Vestfold.

On the other hand, and when it comes to the industry, there are not those big differences regarding their involvement in the regional development processes. TelecomCity and Electronic Coast basically show the same kind of engagement, i.e. it is a kind of engagement that all in all is guided by the legitimate self-interests of the individual corporations. Rather, the differences are to be found when it comes to the size of the firms and their ownership. In Blekinge, beside the small local ones, there are a number of big international corporations with ownership outside the county. In Vestfold it is the other way around, small and medium sized firms with local or regional ownership.

We will discuss the role of the higher education system and the issue about partnership in separate sections and therefore we summarise what we think about the differences regarding actors and networks like this:

The difference of the second order seems to be, on the one hand, about structures of trust in and between networks of actors, and, on the other, the level of dependence on power struc-

tures outside the region. That is, the public actors in Blekinge seem to be more dependant on Stockholm than their colleagues in Vestfold are dependant on Oslo. In Blekinge this might have to do with a historical and collective lack of self trust (Stevrin & Uhlin 1996), while such a deficiency is hard to find in Vestfold. But what is more, the interpersonal and inter organisational trust in Blekinge seem to be on its way down, while in Vestfold it seems to be the other way around. Now, this is admittedly a BTH speculative, but we think that there is enough of substance in our observations in order to justify our plan to deepen our studies of structures and processes of trust in this cross-regional learning project.

### **Differences regarding partnership**

In this context the concept of partnership is rather complicated. That is, our story about Blekinge is very much about a partnership between municipalities, higher education, and business life, but it is about an "unofficial" and, at least in the beginning, a spontaneous partnership. There is also an official partnership that has been initiated by the Government and which is organised in order to manage the imposed work with regional growth agreements (regionala tillväxtavtal, RTA) and later on with regional growth programmes (regionala tillväxtprogram, RTP).

As we have seen, the unofficial and spontaneous partnership was triumphant in Ronneby from the mid 1980s until 1994, a period when municipality, higher education and corporations in a broad alliance built the nationally as well as internationally recognised Soft Center. From mid 1990s this partnership has gradually withered. Today, it is close to non-existent. The picture of the unofficial partnership in Karlskrona shows a similar pattern, from take-off in the middle of the 1990s to the punctuation of the IT-bubble in the spring of 2000. That is, TelecomCity is indeed still functioning, but today it is in the first hand a business network. The efforts in connection with the project "Wireless Communications" to weld together three local innovation systems to a regional system in partnership with three municipalities, BTH, and some big companies have also failed. And furthermore, the imposed official partnership about the RTA- and RTP-processes has so far not made any significant imprints on the regional development process. The Government's own evaluation report (Ds 2003:43) on the contrary shows that Blekinge in comparison with other regions in Sweden has reached comparatively modest results.

There is another kind of picture in Vestfold. Three years ago the county municipalities in Norway (fylkeskommunene) got the responsibility for regional development. This happened at the same time as the hospitals and the healthcare system was transferred from the county municipalities to the state. The immediate effect for Vestfold was that the budget was scaled down with 25 MNOK, and this will be repeated for five years. This, of course, has led to big consequences regarding organisation and personnel. For the new regional development responsibility Vestfold has got modest 5.5 MNOK per year, while other counties, especially in the north, have got Government money that comes to two- and even three-digit amounts in MNOK. What is more, the Norwegian Government has not imposed anything like the Swedish RTA- and the RTP-processes. This means, that the issue of partnership in Vestfold all in all is a local and regional affair, not a state imposed and controlled thing as in Blekinge in recent years.

Furthermore, in Vestfold one has been able to build on old networks and partnerships. Hence, nine of the fourteen municipalities have since long a tight cooperation concerning different development issues. And the Electronic Coast network has been operative since the mid 1990s. The important partnership now, however, is the big partnership that we have described above, i.e. the partnership between the county municipality, the county governor, the fourteen municipalities, the Vestfold University College, and the regional sections of NHO and LO.

And parallel to this, as we also have described above, there is the work going on with a regional enlargement together with the counties of Buskerud and Telemark.

The difference of the second order is about the issue how the partnership in Blekinge and Vestfold respectively has got its local and regional shaping in relation to the power centre in Stockholm and Oslo respectively. To start with, it is obvious that there is a striking difference between Sweden and Norway in that in Sweden there is a strong tradition of centralised government. During the post-war period this tradition has got a particular outline through Keynesian intervention policies with a social democratic profile. Except for a period during the Gerhardsen administration, and for historical reasons, the same tradition has never existed in Norway. What is more, the Norwegian social democratic party (Arbeiderpartiet) seems to have lost its old dominant position for good.

Secondly, here we immediately encounter issues about the allotment of responsibility between state, region and municipality when it comes to future welfare, i.e. issues that are high on the political agenda in all the Scandinavian countries. In Sweden the so called Responsibility Committee (Ansvarskommittén) has presented its first report (SOU 2003:123) and the Government has recently given the committee additional directives for its assignment, an assignment that has been characterised by one of the most influential ministers as aiming at supposedly "the greatest change of the Swedish societal organisations since the early 17<sup>th</sup> century". In Norway a similar committee (Oppgavefordelingsutvalget) some years ago presented a bundle of suggestions (NOU 2000:22) that were obviously too controversial, because a new committee was almost immediately appointed (Effektutvalget). This new committee in turn recently presented its conclusions (NOU 2004:X) but so far with no visible effects.

On a more profound level all this is about the withering of the national states of the 19th and 20th centuries. They are withering under the contemporaneous pressure from three directions, i.e. from the supranational level, foremost the EU, from different sorts of global networks, e.g. multinational corporations, and from ever stronger regional interests (e.g. Törnqvist 2003, Veggeland 2002). That is, the entire question about partnership has to be seen from a perspective where the EU strategy has been to impose the partnership idea on the member countries. Indeed, partnership has developed into the very idea that everyone has to serve and obey. But we are obviously dealing with two different kinds of partnerships, on the one hand bottom-up partnerships, as in Ronneby in the late 80s and early 90s, as in Karlskrona in the late 90s, and now in Vestfold, and on the other hand partnerships that could best be characterised as imposed bottom-up-from-the-top partnerships, as in the instructions from Vinnova regarding the case of "Wireless Communications".

### **Differences concerning the role of higher education**

There are many similarities between Blekinge Institute of Technology (BTH) and the University College of Vestfold (HIVE). For instance, there are more or less as many students (c 5000), and both are young, BTH was founded in 1989 and HIVE in 1994. They both have a technology profile, and in relation to that profile both institutions have some additional "odd" educational programmes. And they are both substantially involved in a range of development programmes in the surrounding society.

HIVE has its roots in a school of engineering founded in 1855 and a school of nautical studies founded in 1859, both affiliated to the naval base and wharf in Horten. The University College founded in 1994 was the result of bringing together some other schools, e.g. a teacher training college and a nurses' training school. The foundation of HIVE was, moreover, not caused by labour market problems, as was the case in Blekinge, but it was the result of an administrative reform in which numerous small higher education institutions all over Norway were brought together in fewer but larger units. Thus, when BTH during the 1990s was regarded as something of a national ideal and as an example of entrepreneurial spirit, HIVE had

to fight against a picture of itself as a rather uninteresting administrative conglomerate. At that time, there was a saying in Blekinge that there was a risk that the politicians on the national level were going to "kill BTH by loving it too much"; today they seem to have forgotten it altogether. It is not exactly the other way around in Vestfold, but it is an undeniable fact that HIVE nowadays attracts more and more visitors from the political scene in Oslo.

What is more, so far HIVE has not succeeded to establish itself on the national and international research scene to the same extent as BTH, which, as we have said above, was granted partial university status in 2000. That is, BTH has full university rights within its faculty of technology, but not within other faculties. Now, the immediate reason for this difference more seems to be a question of different science policies in Sweden and Norway than lack of initiatives from HIVE. Thus, when Swedish science policy in the 1990s favoured the regional university colleges – the first president of BTH was for instance not only allowed but encouraged to recruit both nationally and internationally renowned research teams – the Norwegian policies favoured the old and big universities and, when it comes to especially applied sciences, the regional research institutes. Vestfold is by the way one of the few counties in Norway that has no such institute.

The difference of the second order is about how these two small higher education institutions with an applied and technical profile relate to what has been called "the post-academic condition" (Ziman 2000). This is a condition characterised by the fact that the academic system is no longer a discreet system in relation to the rest of the society, i.e. higher education and society flow into each other and form a complex social mega-system. What is more, the higher educational institutions, and especially those with an applied and technical profile, are supposed more and more to be able to support themselves financially. This has developed into a situation that could be described metaphorically as a psychological double bind situation. That is, whatever one does it is wrong and one will therefore be punished in one way or the other. And moreover, it is impossible to run away from the situation. Other institutions are entangled in a web of both intricate old academic ideals and new ones about immediate results and goods for the society. Both BTH and HIVE are stuck in this situation. On top of that BTH finds itself in the backwaters after an enormous success and has difficulties to get out into the fast current again. HIVE is laboriously climbing towards higher and higher academic status, and especially the right to give bachelor and master degrees in more disciplines. But again and again HIVE is stuck in muddy values, invisible demands and old structures that seem to be held up by the old universities and, behind them, the Ministry for Higher Education and Research in Oslo.

The only way to break out of a double bind is to bend the rules and regulations, and, above all, too free oneself from self-inflicted restrictions. This, of course, is easier said than done, and it seems to require desperate situations to do it, like in Ronneby in the mid 1980s, or, like in Karlskrona and at BTH in the mid 1990s. And it also requires a strong, charismatic and entrepreneurial leadership, which, however, a lot of people tend to find both despotic and ruthless.

## 6 Space of experience and horizon of expectation

Against the background given above, and as a kind of methodological programme for the rest of the project, we will now try to specify what basic concepts needed in a cross-regional learning project aiming at regional development. This section, therefore, is to be understood as our methodological point of departure.

To start with, we are now able to assert that it is not only what we above have called historical differences between Blekinge and Vestfold that have temporal aspects, it also goes for

the differences between the roles of higher education in both regions, how the partnerships are organised, and what characterises the networks. In fact, we are faced with a multitude of histories that are layered on top of each other. Nevertheless, we take it for granted that there has been a past, there is a present, and there will be a future. But, says Reinhart Koselleck<sup>5</sup> (2004), this "present" is not just the place where the future is transformed into a past, it is also the space of action where the battle is fought over our understanding of the past, and, at the same time, the field where political and other interests is fighting over the shape of the future.

Koselleck is of course not the only one that has been (and still is) thinking about how the past, present and future interfere with each other, how they shape each other, and in strange ways presume each other; Augustine, Vico, Tolstoy and Orwell did it, just to name a few of many. However, Koselleck stands out in one particular respect, namely, he is *methodologically* occupied with what Arendt (2004) with reference to Kafka has described as man's "battle experience" holding the position between past and future. And it is exactly this we want to focus, i.e. Blekinge's and Vestfold's experience of holding the position between past and future - this is the heart of the matter in our cross-regional learning project. So, which are the methodological prerequisites and constraints? Which are the basic concepts?

Because, Koselleck calls in question the linear assumption of time and argues that neither the past nor the future is something absolute and exclusive. Instead he claims that both concepts have to be understood relatively and as existing in a continuum; there is a future in the past, and a past in the future. Historic prophecies and prognoses are nothing but forecasts in the past, i.e. every time we do something with some sort of request on the future – for instance when we plan for regional development – this very request is in fact a piece of the past in a story-bound future.

Now, it goes without saying that there is such a thing as diachronic time, i.e. where past time, present time and future time follow each other linearly. But the way Koselleck argues imply that there is *also* synchronic time where the past, present and future are stacked as time-layers over and under each other in a non-linear way; these time-layers constitute what Koselleck has called "simultaneous non-simultaneity". Hence, in order to inquire about the time in which we live (e.g. in a cross-regional learning project) it is necessary to separate these time-layers from each other in order to describe their respectively specific nature. The way to do this, Koselleck argues, is to investigate the basic concepts we use, and especially the basic concepts that characterise our time.

Concepts differentiate themselves from words in that they are ambiguous. What transforms a word into a concept is the entire socio-political context of meaning that the word refers to and which is a part of the concept. Moreover, concepts are used synchronically. And of course, this is how matters stand with many of today's socio-scientific and socio-political basic concepts, for instance triple helix, cluster, partnership, and regional development. Koselleck does not discuss these concepts, he is occupied with concepts like revolution, democracy, communism, and so forth. But he makes a statement about "his" concepts that also holds for "our's"; concepts like these have a clear temporal dimension, i.e. they not only reach backwards, to history, but they also interfere with the future, and they define the horizon of expectation.

This brings us to the relation between two of Koselleck's most interesting methodological concepts, namely space of experience ("Erfahrungsraum") and horizon of expectation ("Erwartungshorizont").<sup>6</sup> Experience and expectation are not alternative concepts, on the contrary, they are intertwined and presume each other, no experience without expectation, and no expectation without experience. And this is his thesis:

[E]xperience and expectation are two categories appropriate for the treatment of historical time because of the way they embody past and future. The categories are also suitable for detecting his-

torical time in the domain of empirical research since, when substantially augmented, they provide guidance to concrete agencies in the course of social and political movement (Koselleck 2004:258).

In simple language, the thesis has two parts, the one with a meta perspective, and which is about thematisation of historical time, and the other that says that historical time governs political and social actors.

Koselleck defines experience as "present past, whose events have been incorporated and can be remembered". And it makes sense, he argues, to say that experience based on the past is spatial since it is assembled into a totality, within which many layers of earlier times are simultaneously present, without, however, providing any indication of the before and after.

When it comes to expectation Koselleck however argues that it is more precise to use the metaphor horizon than space because the horizon is the line behind which a new space of experience will open, but which cannot yet be seen. In spite of prognoses, prophesies, forecasting, back-casting and all the other attempts to manage the future there is an absolute limit beyond which we cannot know, because it cannot be experienced.

Koselleck's meta-perspective says that the tension ("battle") between experience and expectation brings forth historical time. He gives us two examples that are illuminating. The first is about prognoses and starts with the statement that a prognosis always takes off from experience and with a diagnose, i.e. it is from the space of experience that the horizon of expectation is seen. However, the prognosis is also constructed in the light of the decree to expect something. That is, in the prognosis expectations are let loose, expectations that can not be deducted only from experiences. Put another way, "the previously existing space of experience is not sufficient for the determination of the horizon of expectation" (2004:263).

Now this meta-perspective of course becomes especially important as soon as we realise that there are obvious prognostic elements in the basic concepts that are used when one deliberates over regional development. In fact, the concept regional development in itself contains prognostic elements, i.e. expectations that are let loose as soon as one talks about development. The same of course goes for concepts like innovation system, triple helix, regional development plan, and so forth.

Koselleck's other example is about the events in connection with the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. These events have really happened, he says, no one can doubt that. But, the experiences which are based upon these events can change over time because accumulated experiences overlap and mutually impregnate one another. That is, the space of experience is successively changed. In addition, new hopes or disappointments, or new expectations, enter them with retrospective effect. Hence, it is now apparent that not only are reinterpretations of a certain historical time "natural", e.g. of the events in Blekinge from the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s, but, and for this reason, also that the horizon of expectation was, and will be, affected by these (re)interpretations, e.g. in connection with this cross-regional learning project.

Now, the nucleus of Koselleck's thesis as we see it is this: When the space of experience falls apart all old expectations lose their values a new horizon *has* to be opened. This was for instance the case at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and with the French Revolution. This is a good example of the particular kind of time that Koselleck has named "historical time" and which governs political and social actors in the sense that they just have to find, or invent, or perhaps even innovate, a new horizon of expectation, because no experiences were valid any more. In his novel *Absolute Friends* about two spies in the aftermath of the DDR collapse John le Carré has succinctly formulated this kind of situation: "There is no tomorrow. Not as it was yesterday."

So, what about Blekinge and Vestfold? Are these two regions exposed to such important changes that respectively space of experience has blown apart and new horizons of expecta-

tion have to be innovated? We will not even try to answer these questions now, but in the forthcoming comparative studies there are good reasons to inquire about what new industrial structures in Blekinge and Vestfold have indicated about both experiences and expectations. And just one brief example in order to illustrate this:

Both Karlskrona and Horten have a long history as the main naval base in respectively country. But whereas both the base and the wharf in Horten were closed down in the 1980s, the opposite recently happened in Karlskrona. That is, in December last year (2004) the Riksdag decided not only to maintain the base and wharf but to indirectly strengthen them by closing down the Navy's facilities in other places. On top of that there was also a decision to maintain the Air Force base in Ronneby. This has been perceived by politicians in Blekinge as the salvation of the region.

Does this mean that the space of experience blew apart in Vestfold in the mid-1980s and that it was paramount to open a new horizon of expectation? What happened, what did the old and new horizons of expectation look like, and what was done in order to approach them? And does it mean that the ICT euphoria in Blekinge in the 1980s and 90s must be perceived but as a short interval and that people in general now are relieved to be able to return to the space of experience that has been theirs for 300 years, and to its resumed safe horizon of expectation?

But there is an even wider perspective: In both Sweden (e.g. Thörnqvist 2002, Uhlin 2005) and Norway (e.g. Veggeland 2002) there are undeniable signs that the nation-state is withering, or put in Kossleck's terms, that the space of experience that the nation-state project has formed since the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century now is falling apart. What is the significance of this process with regard to the need to develop a new horizon of expectation for (regional) development in a country that is, respectively is not, a member of the EU?

In sum: The main objective in the studies ahead is to analyse differences between space of experience and horizon of expectation in Blekinge and Vestfold, and to put up the defined differences against both established theory and habit of practice when it comes to regional development. This has to be done with a broad participation from all involved actors, otherwise there will be no cross-regional learning.

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## Notes:

<sup>1</sup> We have deliberated whether or not to use the concept of benchlearning in this study, but have decided against it for the following reasons. First: The concept of benchlearning has been coined and defined by Karlöf, Lundgren & Edenfelt Froment (2000) and in a follow-up by Dahlgren, Eklund, Froment, Helin Lövingsson, Karlöf, Mallander, Täfte & Pleijel (2004). In both books it is clear that the authors by benchlearning basically mean "to learn from an ideal model". The Swedish word that is used is "förebild" (norw. *forebilde*, germ. *Vorbildt*). There is no single word, or combination of words, in English that corresponds exactly to this Germanic word. However, it is perfectly clear that Karlöf *et al* do not mean an abstract and/or idealistic model similar to Weber's famous ideal types. No, they suggest comparisons with a *concrete* model, for instance a real company that is chosen as a role model. Now, in our comparison between Blekinge and Vestfold, this is not the case. Neither the one region nor the other is a role model or a "förebild" to the other. Thus, we intend to compare two rather similar regions that are involved in fairly similar regional development programmes with, in both cases, focus on relatively similar kinds of industry. Second: In both books interesting and valuable insights are demonstrated regarding practical aspects of learning. On the other hand, benchlearning is supposed to be an effect of comparisons between the own company (or university, or public institution, etc) and the role model. We are not convinced by the authors' arguments regarding how it is possible to learn from differences (see our own argumentation in section 2 of this study). And what is more, in this respect, we think that much more thinking has to be done concerning compatibility and commensurability of categories before the concept of benchlearning is possible to be used with some degree of scientific rigour. Third: In all comparisons, e.g. in all evaluations, but also in benchlearning processes as we understand Karlöf *et al*, there is always an element of *valuation* that has to do with value philosophy and value theory. This aspect is totally neglected by Karlöf *et al*.

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<sup>2</sup> The methods that will be used in this cross-regional learning project have been developed by Finsrud and Uhlin in a similar project between the counties of Sörmland in Sweden and Vestfold in Norway. Focus in that project has been on interactive leadership in public sector networks. Reports from the project, also about methods used, will be presented this year (2005).

<sup>3</sup> Section 3 builds by and large on Nilsson, J.-E. (ed.); "The Role of Universities in Regional Innovation Systems – A Nordic Perspective", Report to The Nordic Industrial Fund, 2003. Moreover, both Nilsson and Uhlin have on a personal level continuously been involved in the regional development process in Blekinge since the early 90s.

<sup>4</sup> Section 4 builds by and large on the reports (see references) by Brøgger and Finsrud. Both have on a personal level taken part in the development process in Vestfold since the mid 90s.

<sup>5</sup> Koselleck is considered to be "the foremost exponent and practitioner of *Begriffsgeschichte*, a methodology of historical studies that focuses on the invention and development of the fundamental concepts (*Begriffe*) underlying and informing a distinctively historical (*gesichtliche*) manner of being in the world" (Hayden White's foreword to Koselleck's *The practice of Conceptual History; Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, Stanford University Press 2002)

<sup>6</sup> Koselleck underlines the importance to differentiate between two types of concepts, on the one hand historical concepts, i.e. concepts that the historian is interested in as remnants from a particular historical time, and, on the other, concepts that the historian uses as methodological tools in his analysis. Space of experience and horizon of expectations clearly belong to the latter category.

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